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This paper covers a considerable territory. It moves from instructions to be found  in 
elementary logic textbooks all the way to the prospects for their computer automation,  passing 
through such issues as the nature of rules, defaults, heuristics and the ‘meta-data’ associated with 
logical analysis. I can only touch on a few aspects of all this, and will start with the beginning 
and the textbook instructions. 
Professor Asquith’s  questions about the nature of these instructions brings to mind an old 
distinction we used to draw between knowing-how and knowing-that. The instructions here 
considered are so-called ‘how-to’ instructions, but knowing the instructions, considered by itself, 
falls on the knowing-that side of the line; it is knowing that you will perform a certain task (call 
it the target task) if you perform certain other tasks (call them the method tasks). There may be 
alternative ways of performing the target task and so there may be alternative instructions. It may 
also  be that the method tasks must be sequenced in a certain way; in that case knowing the 
sequence will also be a part of knowing the instructions. 
As Asquith points out, such instructions are often formulated as imperatives, but they are 
what Kant would call hypothetical imperatives; they have no practical consequence until you set 
out actually to perform the target task. And even then, knowing the instructions won't do you any 
good if you do not know how to perform the method tasks. This is where the knowing-how 
comes in.  To be sure, there may also be further instructions for doing a method task, which will 
reduce it to what we might call a method sub-task. But ultimately, the instruction hierarchy  must 
get down to tasks that you already know how to do.  To be effective, instructions must connect  
target tasks with pre-existing abilities, or, as I shall call them, basic skills, including, if need be, 
the skill of properly sequencing the method tasks. You need to have these skills if you are to 
learn how to do the target task by learning the instructions. But if you do know the instructions 
and do possess the skills then you will able to perform the target task. 
This way of thinking about instructions leads to two questions about our logic textbook 
instructions: What is their target task? What are the basic skills they presuppose? 
Asquith gives a rough statement of the target task at the outset of his paper: the 
instructions are for “argument recognition and reconstruction.” And Govier’s last rule specifies it 
further; the task is to convert an original text into a standardized version, presumably one to 
which rules of logical evaluation can be applied. This is the target task which I think we may call  
the interpretation task; it is typically a preliminary to an evaluation task in which we decide 
whether the argument interpretation has discovered is any good. 
And as for the basic know-hows  presupposed by the interpretation instructions, the most 
important is clear from Govier’s first rule; to carry out these instructions you must be able to read 
and understand the passage. But other skills are needed as well. For one thing, as Asquith points 
out, the target task is one of finding and reporting meta-data, and this requires knowledge of the 
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meta-language in which such data are reported, which requires being able to understand and 
apply its concepts, such as those of “premise”, “conclusion”, etc. And, as Asquith notes, this will 
require reasoning, and in particular reasoning that involves the weighing of reasons for and 
against applying these meta-concepts to particular text elements (Section 5.2). 
That this kind of reasoning is involved in carrying out the instructions leads, I believe, to 
two interesting ideas, one about our conception of the target task, the other about the required 
skills. 
With regard to the target task, the notion of reasoning as the weighing of pros and cons is 
helpful because it suggests a useful extension. That task has been conceived as having to do with 
argument, (Section 5.1) but, as Asquith points out, there is lack of agreement about just what 
argument is. He suggests moving to “giving a reason” as a necessary condition for argument, but 
there is uncertainty about that too. I suggest we move even beyond this to the notion of having a 
reason as part of a rational thought structure, that is, a collection of thoughts (beliefs, intentions, 
attitudes, whatever) structured on the basis of some being reasons for or against others. Change 
some of the thoughts in such a structure and rationality will require changing others.  Some such 
structures, or portions of them, will be expressed as arguments, but others will be expressed in 
other ways. And reasons may be present in the expressed thought structure without being given 
as reasons. 
For example, suppose I say, “Jones is from Alberta so he must be a supporter of the 
Reform Party.” That expresses a fragment of a thought structure in which the Alberta bit figures 
as a reason for the Reform Party bit. And I have expressed it straightforwardly as an argument in 
which the one bit is given as a reason for the other. But suppose I say instead, “Even though he 
has a Ph.D. in Political Science, Jones supports the Reform Party”.  I do not here present an 
argument, but still there is an expression of a fragment of a rational thought structure, one in 
which the Ph.D. bit figures as a reason against the Reform Party bit. But it is not clear that I am 
giving it as such a reason. My point might be simply that even though the Ph.D. may be a reason 
against the Reform hypothesis, it would be outweighed by other considerations. 
Such reason organized thought structures, or rather, scraps of them, can find expression in 
scraps of language, and so we can say that the target task of our instructions is to find and report 
the relevant features of a rational thought structure expressed in a given passage, and we needn’t 
get hung up about the exact nature of argument and the giving of reasons. Arguments and reason 
giving will just be special cases of  thought structure expression, and interpretation will consider 
that aspect when relevant to context and purpose.  The Ph.D. thing might or might not be relevant 
to a discussion about Jones and Reform, and so the target task might or might not require taking 
note of it. 
Now for the second idea. That the reasoning employed in carrying out the target task 
involves weighing pros and cons also tells us something about the required basic skills.  The 
method tasks will include the exercise of judgment; if they are rule following tasks, then at least 
some of the rules will be of the ceteris paribus type, and judgment will come in when the other 
things are not equal. 
One is reminded here of the ethical theory of W. D. Ross according to which ethical 
knowledge consists in knowing rules of primi facie obligation; if you promised to do it then, 
other things equal, you ought to do it. But when other things are not equal -- you are, say, 
considering returning a borrowed sword to a friend who has now gone murderously insane -- you 
must weigh up the various conflicting obligations. And, says Ross, quoting Aristotle, “the 
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decision rests with perception” (The Right and the Good, 1930, p. 42). Or, to put it another way,  
an exercise of judgment is required. That’s the way it is with the interpretation phase of logical 
analysis too. 
But none of this means that there is anything wrong with the textbook instructions. They 
provide a framework for the exercise of this judgment as well as practice for developing it. And, 
I think, this is the way we really want it. Suppose we had a judgment free procedure for 
extracting arguments from texts. It would, of course, be rather complicated. Suppose that its 
complication were such that, say, getting the structure of my Alberta-Reform argument were 
about as hard as using long division to divide 17 into 193 to an accuracy of 5 decimal places. 
Would we actually want to teach such a thing to students, and have them use it? Would we use it 
ourselves? 
And so our familiar instructions should not be regarded as failed attempts to be like that. 
But there may still be a place for automation. Once judgment has done its work it may be 
possible to automate other parts of the job. And at the end of the paper Asquith indicates several 
possibilities along this line. Instructions, different from the ones given to students, could be given 
to computers which could then generate useful logic exercises, and sample interpretations against 
which students could try their judgment. That’s all to the good, but we never wanted to treat the 
students themselves as computers. 
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